Bahrain: A New Front in the Battle between Sunni Muslims and the Shia

By: Tallha Abdulrazaq

The wave of popular unrest that has engulfed the Middle East region in recent months has paved the way for opportunistic power politicking on behalf of certain regional powers. In Tunisia, decades of oppressive rule combined with corruption, lack of jobs and increased food prices began this chain reaction of events leading to the downfall of several of the Middle East’s ‘old guard’, including Tunisia’s Ben Ali, and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak. Indeed, we can now see from the UNSC sanctioned no-fly zone in Libya that the old Arab regimes are beginning to crumble one by one. It is in this sort of environment that players interested in exploiting the chaos are attempting to expand their influence and power via the use of religious ideology.

Case in point, the revolt in the Kingdom of Bahrain; the Shia who, depending on which figures and sources are consulted, represent 50-70% of the population began to protest against supposed state prejudice and lack of effective representation. This gripe surprisingly managed to manifest itself even following elections in 2010 that saw the Shia Al-Wefaq party win a majority of 18 seats in the Bahraini Council of Representatives. The Shia demands began with greater political freedoms without regime change, but that swiftly changed once the Bahraini government attempted to clear Pearl Roundabout, what protesters were hoping would be akin to the Egyptian revolutionaries Tahrir Square, and killed 3 protesters. As the government security apparatus is dominated by Sunni Arabs, this violent response was then capitalised upon by the Shia opposition who started to utilise sectarian rhetoric, which shall be discussed later. Since then, the Bahraini police and army has advanced and retreated in turn, before the Bahraini Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad requested the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to send troops to help guard key strategic sites.

Whilst it is obvious that the Bahraini government is not entirely democratic – by virtue of the fact that it is a monarchy with a Consultative Council appointed by the king himself – it is still more politically open than the absolute monarchy of neighbouring Saudi Arabia and other similar states. In fact, the Consultative Council even has representatives of Jewish and Christian backgrounds, as well as a sizeable Shia presence. Although one must be cautious not to say a state is just and fair just because its neighbours are far worse, there is clear evidence in Bahrain of progressive and incremental democratic change within state institutions. Indeed, as previously mentioned, the Al-Wefaq party recently won a majority in the elections for the Council of Representatives in 2010, which is decided upon by universal suffrage. At the time, Ali Salman, Shia leader of Al-Wefaq and MP, lauded the results but said that more steps needed to be taken. It is surprising indeed that in the space of not even a year, and after winning such an election, the Shia have decided that the democratisation process is taking too long and the next step should be to come out in mass demonstrations rather than to capitalise on their political victories. Evidently, there appears to be a not-so-subtle prodding of the Shia population to revolt from an external power, Iran, and arguably the protests have very little to do with democratic change and everything to do with Iranian power projection and sectarianism as evidenced by the burning of several Sunni mosques and attacks on the Sunni population who have, by and large, not taken to the streets.

A key player with much to gain if the Sunni Al-Khalifa family are toppled is Iran. Iran has been keen to expand its influence, especially amongst countries with large Shia populations, via the use of religious and ideological infiltration. Indeed, one can easily see this effect in post-invasion Iraq with Iranian supported Nouri al-Maliki and his Dawa party amongst others, and even in Lebanon where Hezbollah acts as Iran’s proxy and Hassan Nasrallah frequently makes fiery speeches strongly in support of Iran. The strategic gains that Iran could make by supporting the Bahraini Shia in their uprising are many. Geographically, by securing Bahrain via Iran’s ideological dominance over Shia society and politics, Iran would gain a strategically positioned island which would give it commanding presence over the Arabian Gulf, potentially threatening oil shipping of other oil rich states much as it did by attacking Kuwaiti shipping in the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980’s. Moreover, it would then gain a better location from which to place its missiles and potentially its armed forces in order to more effectively coerce other Gulf Arab states, particularly regional enemy Saudi Arabia. Finally, the US 5^th Fleet that is stationed at Bahrain would either have to find a new home, or else barter and deal with the Iranians. The lack of response in Washington over the GCC intervention and the visit of Defense Secretary Robert Gates just prior to the decision speak volumes about US interests in the region.

Iranian influence, political and religious, can be readily viewed on many Iranian government statements in support of the Bahraini Shia, and even TV stations that show masses of protesters hefting pictures of leading Shia clerics, including the aforementioned Hassan Nasrallah, with even Hezbollah banners making an appearance. This inevitably leads one to question; what does Hezbollah and banners of “O Hussein!” – in reference to the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson, a symbol of Shi’ism – have anything to do with democracy? That is akin to protesting about university cuts in Britain whilst exhorting people to convert to Christianity; the different causes have nothing to do with the other. One must then reasonably conclude that this revolution is primarily fired by sectarian interests and not misgivings with the current political organisation in the Kingdom. This is supported by the acts of the Shia demonstrators themselves. From the beginning they claimed to be partaking only in peaceful protests; however, Al-Arabia news channel recently showed footage of a Bahraini policeman, clearly wounded and not moving on the ground, being repeatedly and horrifically crushed by 4×4 cars. As if that was not enough, the demonstrators then descended upon his corpse and proceeded to mutilate him. If one was to draw comparisons with the other Arab revolutions, this type of savage violence did not occur. Even in the current Libyan civil strife, the revolutionaries have not partaken in the brutal mutilation of opposing Libyan soldiers or even mercenaries hired by Gaddafi; on the contrary, they have been shown on numerous news channels, such as Al-Jazeera, to have provided them with medical aid.

While Iran is keen to gain a stronger position in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and other GCC states are just as eager to see them fail. The Saudi’s problems with Iran are primarily sectarian in nature. After the Iranian Revolution, Khomeini began to actively criticise and attack the Saudi Arabian authorities, going so far as to question their religious credentials in being the custodians of the Two Holy Mosques. Saudi Arabia, in turn, supported Iraq during its war with Iran in the 1980’s and this only served to further deteriorate ties. In the modern day, Iran is considered a threat by Saudi because of its religious influence over Saudi’s Shia minority residing in the Sharqeya, or Eastern Provinces, and also the threat of possible Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. Additionally, while states such as the UAE have large Iranian migrant populations, they also have territorial disputes with Iran, such as the dispute over the islands Abu Musa, Lesser Tunb and Greater Tunb. This all serves to encourage GCC action against any possible Iranian power projection in Bahrain.

The GCC were all too happy to render aid when the Bahraini Crown Prince requested it. Saudi Arabia has deployed about 1,000 soldiers to Bahrain and the UAE has also lent the aid of 500 policemen. Their mission, according to public statements, is to protect key Bahraini state facilities and infrastructure. However, this move is incredibly interesting. Obviously, if the Shia in Bahrain were to succeed, Saudi Arabia may face a large scale revolt in its primarily Shia, and oil rich, Eastern Provinces. If a secessionist movement was to arise there, it could potentially turn to Iran for weapons who could now more easily supply them via Bahrain. Iran has had great experience and previous successes in funding and supporting dissidents in rival states, such as the funding of Kurdish rebels over the Shatt al-Arab dispute with Iraq leading to the Iraqi capitulation and signing of the Algiers Accord in 1975. With regards to the UAE, even with their strong economic ties to Iran having been considered, it is not in their interests to have Iran made even stronger by making Bahrain another one of their seemingly growing number of proxies, and yet another island to add to their collection. Interestingly, and not surprisingly, the Iranian government denounced the deployment of GCC troops by calling it an invasion of Bahraini sovereignty. This was then echoed by the Bahraini Shia in several interviews on Arabic news media, such as Al-Jazeera. Clearly, one cannot consider the deployment of GCC troops to be an invasion and violation of Bahraini sovereignty, as they only deployed at the behest of the rulers of Bahrain. Thus, it becomes ever more apparent that sectarianism fomented and encouraged by Iran is the primary factor behind the Bahraini revolt.

With the deployment of a primarily Saudi force, the Iranians are now hard pressed to respond. However, they have limited options. They could arm the Bahraini Shia to encourage violence against the Al-Khalifa, but this is unlikely as the Bahraini Shia would potentially run the risk of being isolated on the small island state and their willingness to die en masse for an increase in Iranian influence is questionable. The Iranians could also directly intervene, but this is even more unlikely as the world would perceive Iran as a true occupying force rather than the current Bahraini government sanctioned GCC deployment. Also, it would mean the use of naval forces which would more than likely engage the US 5^th Fleet who are unlikely to sit idly by. The most likely option is that the Iranians will retreat and wait for a better opportunity, which would inevitably mean the continued preservation of the Al-Khalifa dynasty and the end of the Bahraini Shia revolt, at least for now.

Tallha Abdulrazaq blogs at  The War Journal